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Abstract
Reinforcement learning (RL) in the context of artificial agents is typically used to produce be-
havioural responses as a function of the reward obtained by interaction with the environment. When
the problem consists of learning the shortest path to a goal, it is common to use reward functions
yielding a fixed value after each decision, for example a positive value if the target location has been
attained and a negative one at each intermediate step. However, this fixed strategy may be overly
simplistic for agents to adapt to dynamic environments, in which resources may vary from time to
time. By contrast, there is significant evidence that most living beings internally modulate reward
value as a function of their context to expand their range of adaptivity. Inspired by the potential of
this operation, we present a review of its underlying processes and we introduce a simplified formal-
isation for artificial agents. The performance of this formalism is tested by monitoring the adaptation
of an agent endowed with a model of motivated actor-critic, embedded with our formalisation of
value and constrained by physiological stability, to environments with different resource distribution.
Our main result shows that the manner in which reward is internally processed as a function of the
agent’s motivational state, strongly influences adaptivity of the behavioural cycles generated and the
agent’s physiological stability.
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21 Introduction
Although it is possible to learn efficient behavioural sequences in the context of reinforcement learn-
ing (RL) by propagating value backwards to previously visited states (Sutton and Barto, 1998), this
procedure by itself may fall short in the more demanding context of a motivated agent that has to
adapt to and survive in a situated, dynamic environment. If an agent has several needs, a reasonable
strategy to survive may consist of learning behavioural patterns that prioritise the compensation of
an internal resource over another, as a function of what the environment affords and of the internal
rate of consumption of each resource, in a similar fashion to most animals. However, to reach this
behavioural flexibility via RL in changing environments may demand mechanisms that modulate the
criterion of internal assessment to influence behaviour in an adaptive manner. An example of this
is observed in the the level of pleasure associated to food consumption, which varies a great deal as
a function of the level of hunger (Shizgal, 1997). While an empty stomach typically reinforces the
pleasure and urge with which a meal is consumed, this pleasure progressively diminishes, sometimes
even reverts, as one gradually satiates. Although the modulation of value by the physiological state is
a well known phenomenon, often studied in the context of stimulus devaluation (Dittrich and Klauer,
2011; Eder and Rothermund, 2008), we still lack a unified view of its underlying mechanisms that
facilitate devising procedures to modulate behaviour in RL for artificial agents (Konidaris and Barto,
2006).
Related to this, a tremendous amount of studies in neuro-physiology have devoted to investigate
the underlying mechanisms of hedonic value (HV) (Smith et al., 2011; Grabenhorst et al., 2008).
Loosely speaking, HV refers to the subjective, internally perceived value resulting from any given
interaction. It may influence decision-making and adaptation, and may vary as a function of the state
of the animal and of its perception of the environment. Although hedonic phenomena encompass a
large number of brain areas whose implication is under current investigation (Rolls, 2004; Damasio,
2000), there is some consensus that the neural encoding of HV involves recurrent projections between
ventral striatum, amygdala and prefrontal areas (Alexander et al., 1990), such as orbito-frontal, ante-
rior cingulate or dorso-lateral pre-frontal cortices (Reynolds and O’Reilly, 2009; Hazy et al., 2007;
Tanji and Hoshi, 2001), as well as the dorso-lateral striatum (Guitart-Masip et al., 2011; Rolls, 2004).
We dedicate the next section to review some of this evidence, which inspired us to propose an arti-
ficial implementation of a modulatory mechanism of value, based on these principles. However, our
goal is to investigate the contribution to adaptation of a mechanism of value modulation grounded
on the situated nature of our agent (Can˜amero, 1997; Wilson, 1991), rather than providing a descrip-
tive model of the parts of the brain involved in this process. This mechanism would be tailored to
each sort of stimulus, experience or sensory modality that biases decision-making across candidate
options and its associated reinforcement learning process (McClure et al., 2003). Our proposal may
be therefore viewed as an extension of the ecological relationship between the agent and its environ-
ment (Gibson, 1986; Pfeifer, 1996), to include the dynamics of each internal variable, the resources
offered by the environment to replenish them and the range of policies the agent can possibly learn.
We assume that value modulation varies within a specific range for each resource, expressed along
a single scale that makes it possible to reconcile assessments across dissimilar options (Grabenhorst
and Rolls, 2011; Gurney et al., 1998).
To test our formulation of hedonic value, we expanded a motivated architecture (Cos et al., 2010),
which initially focused on the dynamics of perception only, with an actor-critic algorithm to learn
decision-making strategies (Sutton and Barto, 1981). Therein, our neuro-inspired notion of subjec-
tive assessment is implemented as a value function, and is tested by learning behavioural responses
to different stimuli and physiological states in a manner compliant with the hypothesis of phasic
dopamine as an error signal (Khamassi et al., 2005; McClure et al., 2003; Schultz et al., 2000; Houk
3et al., 1995). The adaptivity of the agent has been assessed in terms of its physiological stability
(Ashby, 1965), as a function of the response to changes in the availability of resources of the envi-
ronment. The results show the influence of the subjective interpretation of reward during adaptation,
and importantly, the dependence of the behavioural patterns and of the agent’s physiological stability
on the agent’s subjective view of the environment.
2 Background and Related Research
Value-based decisions are based on differences of expected value (Wallis, 2012; Kennerley et al.,
2011; Wallis and Miller, 2003), and their related learning algorithms are sensitive to the matching
between expected reward and outcome value (McClure et al., 2003; Houk et al., 1995). However,
differences in value between options are not solely dependent on actions and stimuli, they include
as well a component of subjective perception, constrained by the specifics of an individual and its
relationship with the environment (Pfeifer, 1996; Gibson, 1986). Here we describe this additional
dimension to enhance adaptivity.
In general, most attention in RL has been devoted to structure the problem in a tractable man-
ner, typically by devising an efficient hierarchy of motor primitives; either imposed by prior design
constraints (Mataric´ and Brooks, 1990) or by self-adaptation on the basis of sensorimotor interac-
tion (Toussaint, 2003). The result is a dramatic decrease of the learning interval as a result of a
reduced dimensionality of the RL state-space and a more parsimonious behaviour. In a complemen-
tary fashion, some of the architectures best suited to reproduce aspects of animal behaviour have
incorporated the dynamics of interaction between the animal and the statistics of the environment
to the operation of their adaptation mechanisms (Konidaris and Hayes, 2005; Mataric´ and Brooks,
1990). As an extension to these, we propose to endow motivated agents with an additional element
of behaviour control, namely a mechanism of internal assessment, constrained by the agent’s condi-
tion of situatedness (Cos et al., 2010; Vela´squez, 1998; Can˜amero, 1997; Wilson, 1991). In the same
manner that both perception and value (or reward) based decision-making are processes influenced
by internal physiological processes, our proposal of subjective assessment should be founded on
the specifics of valuation of physiological effect as a result of behaviour executions (Dickinson and
Balleine, 2001), organised in cycles of sensorimotor interaction (McFarland and Sibly, 1975; Seth,
2000). In a continuous fashion, drives may express an urge for action (Hull, 1943) and incorporate
internal information to give rise to the agent’s motivations, which may exert a direct influence on the
saliency of the agent’s behaviours, as part of the internal-external dynamics seeking physiological
stability (Ashby, 1965). Motivation, defined in several contexts and disciplines (McDougall, 1913;
Freud, 1940; Tinbergen, 1951; Lorenz, 1966), often with different nuances, always conveyed the role
of “a substance, capable of energising behaviour, held back in a container and subsequently released
in action” (Hinde, 1971, 1960), hence relating physiology to behaviour.
Intrinsically, the notion of value includes an objective and a subjective component. Objective is
the part independent of the physiological state, subjective is the part dependent on it (Grabenhorst
and Rolls, 2011; Conover et al., 1994; Conover and Shizgal, 1994). Revisiting the adaptation pro-
cesses implemented by some of the aforementioned robotic architectures, most of them could be
classified as based on objective value, as the notion of motivation does not explicitly incorporate
motivation into their modulation of value. An exception is however the Hullian drive based archi-
tecture of Konidaris and Barto (2006), which includes both the expression of intended purpose of
any motivated architecture, combined with the learning of priorities by reinforcement learning. As
a novelty, this architecture includes a procedure of internal modulation that biased its internal mo-
tivations as a function of the environment statistics, e.g., scarce resources result an overexpressed
related motivation, showing that this may lead to a better adaptation. Likewise, Coninx et al. (2008)
4extended Konidaris’ architecture with a model of the basal ganglia (Girard et al., 2008) that arbitrates
between several actions, showing that two different policies arise when there are different environ-
ments. Although these architectures do not explicitly address the notion of hedonic value by using
fixed reward formulae, they strongly suggest that mechanisms of internal modulation do influence the
overall behaviour of the robot. Along a different line of research, Damoulas et al. (2005) proposed a
RL context wherein genetic algorithms were used to evolve an interpretation of physiological effect
in the form of Q-values (Sutton and Barto, 1998), showing that only a small fraction of agents yielded
physiologically stable behaviour to be transferred to the next generation. In conclusion, Damoulas
et al. (2005) showed that adaptivity depends on the manner reward is assessed over generations. In
a complementary fashion to these studies, we propose to investigate the role of a subjective inter-
pretation of reward, modulated by the environment and by the internal dynamics of the agent, which
influences the manner in which reward is used by an actor-critic to adapt behaviour to the environ-
ment. Finally, seeking the maximisation of reward and the avoidance of penalty, other architectures
have included principles of contextual grounding and RL to learn behavioural policies adapted to a
certain environment (Butz et al., 2010).
A brief summary of the neuroscience of decision-making and hedonic value. Despite the progress
about the neural organization of the brain and of the different processes encompassing decision-
making, our knowledge about the interplay of the neural structures implicated in hedonic value re-
mains incomplete (Wallis, 2012; Kennerley et al., 2011). Recent evidence has gradually revealed a
complex and subtle organization of the different factors and sub-roles implicated in decision-making:
expected outcome, energetic cost, hedonic value, time, risk or confidence in decision, associated with
specific brain areas. Numerous experiments have been performed to characterize the operation of dif-
ferent brain areas during the learning of stimulus-response (SR) and behaviour-reward relationships
(Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010), showing that the brain areas mainly responsible for the encoding
of the function and the limbic function are the pre-frontal cortex (Balleine and O’Doherty, 2010)
and the ventral striatum (Guitart-Masip et al., 2011). Next we list a summary of some of the main
relevant aspects of neural encoding related to hedonic value.
• The main brain area specialised in the encoding of hedonic value in an independent manner
of behaviour is the Orbito-Frontal Cortex (OFC). The OFC is an area of integration of mul-
timodal sensory and limbic information (Wallis, 2012; Cardinal et al., 2002), receiving major
afferents from sensory cortex, hypothalamus, dorsal and ventral striatum and amygdala (Rolls,
2005, 2004). Consistently with the operation of hedonic assessment, dependent on the internal
physiology, neurons in the OFC activate with pleasant or positively hedonic stimuli and are
sensitive to stimulus devaluation after satiation (Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2011). Furthermore,
OFC neurons can rapidly reverse their responses to a visual stimulus, depending on whether
its previous association was rewarding or punitive (Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2011). In addition
to OFC, neighbouring areas such as the Anterior Cingulate Cortex (ACC) and the Lateral Pre-
Frontal Cortex (LPFC) have been shown to encode aspects of value related to the energy cost
of the candidate options of different goal-directed actions (Kennerley et al., 2011; Hazy et al.,
2007).
• Absolute vs. Relative Reward. The encoding of hedonic value cannot solely be attributed to
the OFC, as several brain areas exert different functions during the perception-action loop that
necessitate of this notion. Most important may be the bonding between action and value at-
tributed to ACC (Grabenhorst and Rolls, 2011; Quilodran et al., 2008). While the OFC encodes
the absolute value associated to stimuli via projections from the amygdala, the ventral striatum
(nucleus accumbens), and projections to ACC modulate activity and value as a function of ex-
ternal stimuli, incorporating a component of cost into its encoding of value. For example, value
representations in ACC are sensitive to the presence of fat in food (Shizgal, 1997; Conover
5et al., 1994). Furthemore, the nature of value encoding is constrained by the need of imple-
menting decisions, hence requiring the comparison across often dissimilar options. Therefore,
although areas unrelated to the execution of behaviour such as the OFC encode value in abso-
lute terms, value in areas also encoding motor responses, such as PPC and PMd, are relative to
make comparisons possible (Chib et al., 2009).
• Although the involvement of the nigrostriatal circuitry in the arbitration of behaviour has been
long established (Redgrave et al., 1999; Houk et al., 1995), its relation to hedonic value is
still under investigation. A recent study has shown, probably as a means to learn behavioural
policies in an actor-critic-like manner (Li and Daw, 2012; McClure et al., 2003; Houk et al.,
1995), a specialization of the medial part of the substantia nigra pars compacta (SNc) and
ventral tegmental area (VTA) for the encoding of hedonic value (Guitart-Masip et al., 2011),
and of the nucleus accumbens (ventral striatum) for prediction errors (Rushworth et al., 2009;
Hare et al., 2008; Rolls and Grabenhorst, 2008). These areas modulate value by projecting
to the ventro-medial cortex (vmOFC), fine tuning value predictions of future actions (Peters
and Buechel, 2010; Samejima et al., 2005). Different aspects of value are also encoded by
different brain regions; while those aspects of value related to the goal may be attributed to the
mOFC, mPFC and amygdala, those other related to the decision are attributed to the central
OFC (cOFC) (Kable and Glimcher, 2007; Schaeffer and Rotte, 2007). In this context, the
contribution of the basal ganglia is the correction of prediction errors of value and the control of
the intensity with which the behaviour is elicited (Jin and Costa, 2010; Turner and Desmurget,
2010).
In summary, a full description of HV or the sense of valency, as this notion is also referred to
in AI (Ackley and Littman, 1991), would require a descriptive model of the recurrent activity across
OFC, ACC and the ventral striatum. However, rather than a description of the neural activity across
these brain areas, we deemed more useful for its application to artificial agents to build a model that
captures the principle of operation of HV. In this light, the main principle of our model consists of
making the modulation of value dependent on loop of interaction between the agent’s homeostasis
and the sensorimotor cycle. In other words, value is not only dependent on the agent’s internal state,
but also on the perception the agent may build of its environment. For example, the agent will not
value a consummatory action in the same manner if its internal level of energy is close to satiation
than to depletion, and will also vary if the necessary resource is easily attainable or scarce. This
set of principles is captured by a reward formula embedded into an actor-critic RL algorithm, which
aims at maintaining the agent’s internal physiology within the boundaries that permit the agent’s
operation (Can˜amero, 1997) — see sections 3.1 and 3.2. We have tested the performance of this
formulation by monitoring the resulting patterns of decision-making of an artificial agent endowed
with this formulation of HV, tested in several simulated environments. Overall, the results show that
a subjective component to the assessment of value increases learning speed and enhances the stability
of the behavioural patterns.
3 Theoretical Model
The model consists of three main parts: a module of artificial physiology (top right fig. 1), which
is an abstraction of internal physiological processes; a perception module (bottom right figure 1),
which provides grounded knowledge about the behaviours afforded by each object nearby the agent;
a motivated actor-critic module (centre fig. 1), which learns behavioural patterns adapted to the
environment; and a module to calculate hedonic value (see Value Function, centre-top fig. 1). Each
module is described in the next sections, however, we have considered appropriate to introduce a
6preliminary description of the agent’s behavioural structure and of the manner in which it interacts
with the environment. Figure 1
1. The agent is endowed with a behaviour repertoire of consummatory behaviours, that the model
has to learn to sequence to attain physiological stability. By consummatory we refer to the
behaviours of the agent’s repertoire, which may compensate one or more of the agent’s physi-
ological deficits, and are executed by interacting with nearby objects affording their execution
(see the end of section 3.1 for further detail). For example, eating is only possible when an ed-
ible object is nearby. Therefore, we have first endowed our agent with a wandering behaviour
to facilitate exploration and therefore object encountering. As soon as one or more objects
is perceived, a decision is made about which consummatory behaviour to execute, which is
followed by a behavioural interaction with the relevant object.
2. The unit of behaviour assessment is the behaviour compensatory cycle, which is a sequence of
consummatory behaviours leading the agent’s state from a random initial physiological state
to a state of satisfaction (see section 3.1). The RL problem we introduce in section 3.2 has
been structured accordingly as a learning exercise in which the agent is repeatedly initialised
to random physiological states, to be compensated for by learning appropriate behaviour com-
pensatory cycles. These cycles also serve the purpose of providing a measure of average per-
formance for the learning algorithm.
3.1 Artificial Physiology
Our model of artificial physiology consists of a set of homeostatic, survival-related variables, a set of
drives that depend on the internal variables and a repertoire of behaviours. Behaviours are selected
by an arbitration mechanism based on an actor-critic algorithm (see section 3.2).
Homeostatic variables. These are abstractions representing the dynamics of the agent’s internal
resources. We have used three basic homeostatic variables: nutrition, stamina and restlessness.
Nutrition is an abstraction for a number of elements controlling food intake (e.g., glucose level in
blood). As time goes by, its level decreases, as described by equation 1, if food/rest is not periodically
consumed. Stamina represents the level of energy of the agent, which decreases over time if the
agent does not regularly rest. Restlessness is an abstraction of the level of internal agitation, which
increases over time. Each of these variables has an optimal set point hop, and a range of values (their
viability zone) for the agent to remain viable in its environment (Can˜amero, 1997; Ashby, 1965).
Note that restlessness is not a survival variable. If the values of any other variable exceed their
respective physiological boundaries, the agent can no longer operate. Furthermore, each homeostatic
variable exhibits a status of normality (when its value approaches the set point), deficit or excess.
Formally speaking, each controlled homeostatic variable hi varies due to internal bodily dynam-
ics and to the interactions of the agent within its environment as described by equation 1.







⌧i is the exponential decay rate of variable hi. ↵ki is the amount of compensation that results from
the execution of behaviour bk over the variable hi. tjk lists the instants at which behaviour bk is
successfully executed, mathematically signalled by a  (t) Kronecker function. Equation 2 shows the
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7u(t) is the Heaviside-step function. tjk is the jth physiological compensation related to the
execution of behaviour bk. Again, ↵ki is the amount of compensatory effect that results from the
execution of behaviour bk over the variable hi.
Drives. Each homeostatic variable may express its status of deficit or excess via a set of drives
(Hull, 1943). Drives are abstractions denoting urges to action based on bodily needs related to self-
sufficiency and survival. They monitor the divergence of each homeostatic variable with respect to




alm(hopl   hl(t)), (3)
and initiate the process of correction. dm is drive m and the hl the value of the lth related homeostatic
variable and hopl its the optimal (or set) value. alm are the coefficients relating the variable l to the
drive m. In a preliminary fashion, we have restricted its general expression to the case where each
drive depends linearly on a single homeostatic variable. Thus, when a homeostatic variable diverges
from its optimal point, the drive expresses an urge for compensation. In the general case, the value
of several homeostatic variables may influence each drive. In the study presented here, we have
used three drives: hunger (which controls nutrition), fatigue (controlling stamina), and curiosity
(controlling restlessness). At each time step, the drives are assigned an intensity (activation level)
proportional to the deviation of the controlled variable from its set point, which define the agent’s
internal state (see equation 3). Figure 2
Behaviour repertoire. The agent has been endowed with a default exploratory behaviour that
makes it wander in its environment. Furthermore, there is a set of three consummatory behaviours,
which may be engaged by the decision-making module whenever in the vicinity of a consummatory
object (see next section). All behaviours are coarse-grained sub-systems composed of simpler ac-
tions that implement different competencies. The execution of a behaviour modifies (increases or
decreases) the levels of particular internal variables (see equation 1), therefore affecting the satis-
faction of drives. To facilitate later analyses of internal dynamics while respecting our principles of
design, we have constrained the complexity of our homeostatic system, assigning a single behaviour
to compensate each drive — “eat” (approach edible objects) satisfies hunger, “rest” in a shelter sat-
isfies fatigue, and “interact” with any object of the environment satisfies curiosity. For the behaviour
execution to exert a compensatory effect (increment or decrement of the internal homeostatic vari-
ables), it must occur in a context offering that affordance. For example, to compensate the variable
nutrition, the execution of the behaviour eating has to be executed with an edible object nearby.
3.2 Motivated Actor-Critic
This section describes the actor-critic model and the manner in which motivation and reinforcement
are defined and integrated therein. The actor-critic is an on-policy RL algorithm that can learn the
optimal policy to maximise cumulative reward by interaction with the environment (Sutton and Barto,
1981). Its operation has been shown to be in remarkable agreeement with experimental evidence in
the learning of SR associations (Li and Daw, 2012; Schultz et al., 1993), as well as in the learning
of behavioural policies (McClure et al., 2003; Houk et al., 1995). Concomitantly, we propose a
motivated version of this algorithm to learn behavioural policies that minimise the agent’s internal
deficits in environments with different availability and distribution of resources. In consequence,
we defined the vector state sk at the learning episode k as shown by equation 4; comprising the
agent’s drives dk and the potential courses of action as perceptual affordances ak (note that vectors
are underlined) — see equation 4.
8sk = {dk, ak} (4)
Although the behaviour of the robot operates in a continuous fashion, learning occurs only after
each behaviour execution (k indexes the executions of behaviour). The vector ak is the result of a
transformation of sensory input into behavioural saliency, which our agent performs in an automatic
fashion. The resulting values, between 0 and 1, indicate the behaviours afforded to the agent. The
reader may refer to Cos et al. (2010) for a more detailed explanation of how these values may be
learned via sensorimotor interaction.
The executive function of the model is managed by the actor, which evaluates the policy function
for each behaviour and orders the execution of the most salient behaviour. In other words, the policy
expresses the saliency of each behaviour for the current state. This function has been implemented as
a set of three different functions, each implemented as a feed-forward neural network with six units
in the input layer, fifteen in the hidden layer and one in the output layer (6-15-1). The output layer is
linear (cf. centre fig. 3).
In a complementary fashion, the critic has been implemented by a feed-forward neural network
with node distribution 6-15-1 and linear output layer (cf. figure 3), to calculate the expected cumula-
tive reward V ⇤(sk) — see equation 5 — from the current state sk until the goal is attained (the state
sk is within the optimal zone of the agent’s physiological space, see 4).
V ⇤(sk) = E{
kX
l=0
 k lrl|s = sk} (5)
rl is the predicted reward resulting from the transition between state sk and state sk+1, and E the
calculation of expected value. We next summarise the operation of the motivated actor-critic in three
processes: Figure 3
1. The actor makes decisions among the three consummatory behaviours: eat, shelter and interact.
First, the policy values for each behaviour are calculated for the current state sk 1. Since we
have used an ✏-greedy policy, the behaviour exhibiting the highest policy value is executed
80% of the time —see equation 6. The remaining 20% of the times, a behaviour to be executed
is selected at random.
b(sk) = argmaxi{⇧i(sk)} (6)
⇧ is the policy function, sk is the state, and b(sk) is the preferred behaviour at state sk.
2. The convergence of both actor and critic during the learning process is mutually dependent, as
a function of the learning of the Temporal Difference (TD) algorithm (Sutton and Barto, 1981),
see equation 9, adapted to our motivated agent.
3. Each learning episode is internally triggered by the hormone S (see equation 7), whenever the
derivative of any homeostatic variable surpasses the threshold X⇤, and lasts until the level of
the hormone difuses (it becomes smaller than S⇤).






 (t  tin), tin = t||h˙i| > X⇤ (7)
  is the Kronecker delta,  i is the maximal intensity at activation, ⌧s its rate of decay, and tin
the time at which the homeostatic variable hi experiences a sudden compensatory variation.
As such, the hormonal response peaks whenever the derivative of any homeostatic variable
h˙i suddenly surpasses a certain threshold X⇤. Since the rate of change of the homeostatic
variables is several orders of magnitude larger than that of the hormonal response (⌧s <<< ⌧i),
9the value of the hormone will rapidly decrease to zero after the behavioural effect has been
exerted.
At each learning episode, the reward function (see next) yields a quantification of the reward
(rk) associated to a variation of the agent’s physiological effect. The reward obtained rk is then
used by the critic to calculate the TD prediction error (see equation 8).
 k = rk +  V˜ (sk)  V˜ (sk 1) (8)
 k is the prediction error, rk is the reward obtained, V˜ (sk) the estimate of the state-value
function and   is the discount factor that regulates the influence of past states, which we chose
equal to 0.9.  k is then used to update the neural representation of the state-value function
V (sk 1) at the state from which the decision was made sk 1. The update is performed by
an implementation of the TD algorithm, which back propagates the error to the middle and
input layer weights of the neural network (Rumelhart et al., 1986). Likewise,  k is also used to
update the neural estimate of the preference for the behaviour just executed (see equation 9).
The behaviour selection and learning operation are repeated in cycles until convergence (see
experimental section).
pi(sk) = pi(sk) +   k; (9)
  is the learning step and pi is the ith behaviour preference.
4. Based on the evidence reviewed in section 2, we propose a mechanism to calculate reward as a
function of the dynamics of the agent’s physiology and of sensorimotor interaction. Equation





(dk 1   dk) · rˆ
|dk|
(10)
rk is a scalar reward value resulting from the physiological shift of the internal state from
dk 1 to dk, rˆ is the radial unitary vector in the agent’s physiological space, pointing from the
origin radially towards the agent’s physiological state dk (see figure 2). By contrast,  S is the
parameter of the poisson process we used to model the encounters with objects in our simulated
scenario, and varies accordingly to the availability of resources of the environment (see the
experimental section and discussion for further information). Briefly, objects are encountered
at random, in average each  S time units. Hence, this parameter introduces the influence of
a discount factor dependent on the distribution of resources of the environment. In general,
our reward function yields a positive reward for any physiological compensation. However,
its value increases if close to the optimal comfort zone (the inverse of the modulus of |dk| is
large).
Although the variety of behavioural patterns will significantly depend on the type of environment,
we hypothesise that as a result of this formulation of value, the behaviour compensatory cycles will,
at least, include the following regimes: First, it will encourage those behaviours leading away from
the lethal boundary the fastest, as this is as well most rewarding. Second, whenever one or more
of the homeostatic variables are sated, it should encourage behaviours to compensate any remaining
deficits. Third, it should promote consumption of resources rarely encountered. Importantly, this
function of reward is harmonious with the notion of physiological stability introduced by Ashby
(1965), as this is, ultimately, a necessary requirement for the agent to survive.
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4 Experiments
The goal of the experiments is to test the influence of the formulation of HV we just proposed (see
equation 10) by assessing the agent’s behaviour, to adapt to changes of their environment and of
their internal homeostatic dynamics, to seek physiological stability. Although the agent’s behaviour
repertoire consists of a set of elementary behaviours executed individually (see section 3.1), our
analysis focuses on the manner in which these are sequenced to compose cycles of behavioural
compensation, and on other metrics that capture the agent’s adaptation. We briefly describe these
two behavioural levels next. Firstly, the behaviour interaction, which may be considered as the
unit of interaction with the environment, initiated after each interaction with an object. It may be
described as the following sequence of events.
• First, in the absence of any object, the agent executes its default exploratory behaviour, wan-
dering at random.
• Upon detection of a novel object, the agent’s policies are evaluated by the actor for the current
state sk, and a decision is made about the behaviour to execute next (see section 3.2 for further
detail).
• If the execution of the behaviour selected is successful, this may result in an improvement of
the level of one or more homeostatic variables, and on a subsequent hormonal release (see
equation 7).
• Following each hormonal release, reward is calculated as a function of the physiological effect
resulting from interaction with the environment (see eq. 10).
• The agent’s internal homeostatic variables decay over time as described by equation 1. In
addition to this, the reinforcement process is initiated with the calculation of the TD error ( k)
— see equation 8. Both the critic and the actor update their predictions of cumulative reward
and behavioural preference for the previous state sk 1.
Secondly, we call behavioural compensatory cycles to the sequences of behaviour executions,
starting at a random state of the agent’s physiological space and ending when the optimal physi-
ological zone has been attained (see figure 4A) — see section 3.2. These cycles result from the
actor-critic’s training process, consisting of repeatedly resetting the physiological state (sk) to a ran-
dom set of values within the agent’s physiological boundaries, which the agent has to lead to the
optimal zone.
Behavioural Metrics
Our analysis of the influence of HV as modelled here, has focused on the reward value to different
contingencies, parametrized by the following parameters: the rate of decay of the agent’s homeostatic
variables (⌧i decay constants); the distribution of resources of the environment (described by its
distribution of affordances: ideal, abundant or scarce), and their availability, characterised by the  S
parameter. The metrics of learning and behavioural performance are described next. Figure 4
1. Time until stability. This is the time-interval required for the error in the prediction of reward
 k (see equation 8) to reach an asymptotic value, smaller than a certain threshold ✏ (fixed to 0.3
in our simulations).
2. Additionally, we have also assessed the average performance of the resulting behavioural pat-
terns along two complementary axes: the dynamics of its internal physiology and the be-
havioural cycles that result from the learning process. It is important to notice that to obtain
reliable values of assessment, we have alternated phases of learning and assessment at each
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simulation. Specifically, we stopped the training of the actor-critic to assess the current per-
formance at regular intervals of 2,000 decisions (see end of introduction, section 4). Each
assessment interval lasted over 200 decisions. Next we introduce the two complementary met-
rics we defined to this end.
First, the metric of physiological stability, which captures the effect of the learned be-
havioural strategies on the agent’s internal physiology. It is calculated as the average of the
agent’s internal drives over the assessment interval, see equation 11:





and is inspired by the viability indicators of Avila-Garcı´a and Can˜amero (2002). dm is the
value of drive m averaged over the duration of a time interval determined ad hoc for evaluation
purposes (typically 200 behaviour interactions), N is the total number of drives of the agent.
Thus, when all homeostatic variables are optimally satisfied, the value of this metric should be
close to zero.
Secondly, behavioural effectiveness, which results from an analysis of the agent’s be-
havioural cycles (see equation 12). The use of this metric is inspired in the cycles proposed by
McFarland and Spier (1997) in the two-resource problem, and is intended to extract a quantita-
tive account of the agent’s behavioural performance. To perform a systematic test, during the
probing intervals only, we used four meaningful initial physiological states and recorded the
agent’s behaviour compensatory cycles: the first is a highly deficient physiological state close
to the lethal boundary (hunger 0.9, tiredness 0.8 and restlessness 0.7). In the three remaining
initial states, two out of three drives were strongly deficient: (0.5, 0.8, 0.9), (0.9, 0.5, 0.8), (0.9,
0.8, 0.5) — see figure 4B, and we quantified the behavioural efficiency of each cycle, defined
as the average ratio between the amount of physiological compensatory effect, fixed to ri for
all behaviours during the probing, and obtained as a result of the agent’s behaviour interactions







 ri is the amount of physiological effect following the successful execution of the ith be-
haviour and M is the number of behaviours of the cycle (see figure 4). The rationale behind
this metric is that failed behaviour executions yield no physiological effect, and would therefore
reduce its value. By contrast, if each decision within a cycle yields a physiological compen-
sation, this would yield a maximal effectiveness value (close to  r). If plotting this specific
compensatory cycle on the agent’s physiological space, it would resemble a straight line from
the initial state until the optimal zone (see figure 2). Importantly, the metric of effectiveness
has been designed to yield approximately the same value irrespective of the cycle’s initial state,
since only the proportion of compensatory executions of the cycle exerts the most significant in-
fluence on the final value. For example, a cycle of five compensatory and two failed behaviour
executions should yield a similar effectiveness value than a sequence of ten compensatory and
four failed executions ( 5+27 ⇡ 10+414 ). These two values will only differ in so far the longer
sequence will be slightly influenced by the negative value of the failed executions, although




Experimental setup: Modulating Reward
As previously described, our working hypothesis is that the agent’s adaptivity will improve by as-
signing value as a function of the current physiological state and of the statistics of sensorimotor
interaction. To test this hypothesis, we performed a series of simulated runs and compare the results
obtained when varying two factors: the decay of the agent’s internal physiological variables (⌧ decay
constant), and the distribution of resources of the environment. Consistent with a previous study (Cos
et al., 2010), we used three different scenarios, each of which characterised by a certain distribution
of resources.
1. We first used a baseline ideal environment in which all objects afford all behaviours to be
executed by the agent. Furthermore,  S was set to 0.9, meaning that objects were encountered,
in average, every other simulation steps each. Hence, reward value was divided by two.
2. Second, an abundant scenario in which the object affordances were constrained, but were still
relatively frequent. Objects smaller than 0.4 afford eating (50%), objects larger than that afford
shelter (50%) and all objects afford interaction — see figure 5A.  S was set to 0.3, hence
encounters were every three to four steps each (reward value was scaled by a factor of three).
3. Third, a scarce scenario to study the contribution of the resources from the environment and the
agent’s internal physiology to the computation of reward, the scarce scenario. In this scenario,
each object affords a single behaviour as a function of its size; objects smaller than 0.4 afford
graping (50%), objects whose size is between 0.4 and 0.7 afford shelter (25%) and objects
larger than 0.7 afford interaction (25%) — see figure 5B.  S was set to 0.1, meaning that
encounters were, in average, every ten simulation steps each (reward value was scaled by a
factor of 10).
We performed twenty simulation runs per condition, and recorded the time-course of the agent’s
internal physiology and the encompassing behavioural cycles throughout this time. Figure 7
Results
The graphs in figure 6A and 6B show the length of the average behaviour compensatory cycle during
the time-course of the learning phase for the abundant and scarce environments, when compared
with the ideal case. As expected, the cycle length exhibits a gradual shortening in all cases, as
the knowledge about the environment improves and the behavioural policy becomes increasingly
effective. Figure 8
• A visual comparison of the time-course for the scarce and abundant cases (see figure 6A vs.
6B), shows that it takes a similar time to reach a stationary regime in both environments (80
decisions). Note that the stationary regime starts once the agent has attained a stable behaviour,
which yields the short compensatory cycles and a highly efficient behaviour in terms of physio-
logical stability (see figure 6A-D). The final average length of the compensatory cycle obtained
for each scenario were: 11 for the ideal scenario, 18 for the abundant and 26 for the scarce.
The shortest possible cycle length for the given ⌧ decay constant (10ms) is obtained in the ideal
scenario: 11 behaviour executions.
• Similarly, figures 6C and 6D show that the physiological stability (see eq. 11) exhibits a signif-
icant decline over time until reaching a stationary value. Final values close to 0.05 and 0.035
have been reached for the abundant and scarce scenarios, respectively. The similarity between
the time-course of the cycle length and the physiological stability suggests a strong correlation
between both metrics. In other words, it should be expected that an efficient behavioural policy
facilitated a quick satisfaction of internal needs.
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Figure 9
Policy Characterisation. As a means to characterise the behavioural policies, we made a com-
parative analysis between the learnt policies and a set of theoretical but meaningful policies: a purely
motivated policy, which would satisfy the drive exhibiting the largest urge first (Winner-Take-All of
the drives —WTA-D), and a purely incentive-driven policy, i.e., a policy that executes the behaviour
afforded by the closest object (Winner-Take-All of the affordances — WTA-A). We calculated these
metrics during probing intervals of two hundred trials every two thousand decisions, each during
simulations in all three scenarios. This is the basis of a comparative analysis between them at the be-
ginning and end of the simulated run and after the behavioural policy has attained a stationary regime.
The results are shown in figure 7 for the ideal and scarce cases and in figure 8 in the abundant case
(fig. 8A-C).
1. Figure 7A-C shows the results of the aforementioned metrics in the ideal scenario. Figure
7A-B shows the time-course of the agent’s drives during a few cycles, at the beginning of a
simulation and when the stationary regime has been attained, respectively. The magnitudes
shown, from top to bottom are: the value for each drive, the actor’s policy value for each
behaviour, the drive exhibiting the highest urge (WTA-D), and the preferred behaviour accord-
ing to the actor’s policy (WTA-B). Initially, the effect of the learning process may be visually
assessed by comparing the value of the drives and policies between both time intervals. To
facilitate a visual comparison, the colour of each behavioural policy matches the colour of the
drive it is associated with (red for the hunger/eat, green for tiredness/rest and blue for restless-
ness/interact). Remarkably, when the stationary regime has been attained, at each cycle, the
drives decrease efficiently towards their minimum values (see top fig. 7B). Accordingly, the
actor’s policies prioritises those behaviours which could compensate the most urgent deficit the
quickest. This is confirmed by the remarkable similarity between the two WTA graphs, show-
ing that the most urgent drive (WTA-D) and the behaviour whose policy value is the highest
(WTA-B) match one another. In other words, the policy prioritises to execute the behaviour
that would satisfy the most urgent drive first.
Also, to illustrate the similarities between policies, we have plotted the percentage or similarity
between the purely motivated policy, and the actor’s policy — see figure (7C). Although the
percentage of agreement starts as low as 20%, it reaches a remarkable 72%. The remaining
28% may be explained by the ✏ = 0.2 greedy policy, which obliges the actor to select 20% of
the time at random for exploratory purposes.
2. Figure 7D-F shows the same comparative analysis, performed for the data obtained in the abun-
dant scenario. Again, a visual inspection of the behavioural cycles shows that after reaching
the stationary regime, the drives decrease efficiently towards small values at each cycle due to
an efficient policy function (see fig. 7E). As for the previous case, these results suggest that
the actor’s final policy prioritises behaviours to compensate the drive exhibiting the highest
urge first. In other words, the policy is consistent with the principle that when resources are
abundant, the expression of the internal motivations should dominate the behavioural patterns,
as this facilitates the gain of physiological stability and the gathering of cumulative reward.
This tendency is confirmed by the similarity between the theoretical motivated policy (WTA-
D) and the actor’s policy (WTA-B), shown in figure 7DF. As for the previous case, we also
show the percentage of agreement between the hypothetical motivated policy and the actor’s
behaviour, averaged over twenty simulation runs (see fig. 7F). Consistently with our hypoth-
esis, the final stationary value is around 65%. Although smaller than the 72% obtained in
the ideal scenario, this demonstrates that the policy is predominantly motivation-driven, rather
than stimulus-driven. The remaining 35% of mismatch may be distributed between the 20%
excluded by the greedy policy (✏ = 0.2) and a 15% due to decisions of behaviours not match-
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ing the affordance offered by the object nearby or because its physiological effect would on a
homeostatic variable already sated.
3. Figure 8A-C shows the results in the case of the scarce scenario. To characterise scarcity, each
object in this environment afforded a single behaviour to our agent (see fig. 5B). Under these
circumstances, a purely motivated policy would be inefficient, as the agent may frequently en-
counter situations in which the behaviour required to compensate the most urgent need may not
be afforded by the nearby object, yielding long behavioural cycles and relatively low cumula-
tive reward. By contrast, from an ecological perspective, we believe that it may be reasonable
to follow an incentive-driven policy to profit from any available resource. Consistently with
this, figure 8AB shows the sequence of afforded behaviours encountered and the preferred pol-
icy values, during a few initial behavioural cycles and during the stationary regime. As a test
of similarity, we have shown the affordance perceived with the highest value (WTA-A) at all
times, and the preferred behaviour according to the actor’s policy (WTA-B). Despite the initial
mismatch, both metrics exhibit a significant similarity once the stationary regime has been at-
tained. Hence, the learned policy is mostly driven by external stimuli (stimulus-driven) rather
than by the agent’s internal drives (motivation-driven) — see figure 8C.
Behavioural Cycles. Figure 9 shows a few behavioural cycles recorded after the policy was sta-
tionary in the abundant and scarce environments. Each cycle starts whenever the agent’s physiologi-
cal state is initialised at one of three highly deficient states (see figure 4B) and ends once the drives are
satisfied. As previously described, the policies obtained in both environments favour those specific
behaviours leading to the optimal zone the fastest. However, as a result of the specifics in resource
availability and subjective reward assignment in each case, the resulting policies are strongly biased
towards prioritising internal drives (motivated policy) in the abundant scenario and towards externally
driven responses in the scarce one. In particular, encounters in a scarce scenario are less frequent,
implying that the  S characterising the average frequency of object encounter within this scenario
is smaller (see equation 10), which results in a magnification of value in that context. The distri-
bution of resources also exerts a significant influence on the effectivity with which each behaviour
execution compensates the agent’s physiological deficits, and consequently, on the resulting cycles
of behavioural compensation. As shown at the beginning of section 4, cycles tend to be significantly
longer in the scarce than in the abundant scenario. Hence, although the final level of physiological
stability may be comparable, the velocity with which these stationary values exhibits a significant
difference. This intuition is reinforced by the quantification of the metric of behavioural effective-
ness, which is 34% larger in the abundant scenario (0.88 ri) than in the scarce one (0.54 ri) —
see end of section 4.
5 Discussion
Previous studies have investigated several principles related to the notion of value to devise increas-
ingly flexible strategies of adaptation for mobile robotics: behavioural cycles to interact with the
environment (McFarland and Spier, 1997; Ahlgren and Halberg, 1990), new algorithms to incor-
porate novelty (Huang and Weng, 2002), hierarchical RL architectures for skill learning (Konidaris
et al., 2010; Baldassarre, 2002), or the use of algorithms to select learning goals automously using a
value system in a RL context (Merrick, 2010). The operation of each of these approaches is to some
extent based on exploiting the interaction with the environment as a guide to structure behavioural
responses. In a complementary fashion, here we reviewed some evidence from neuroscience under-
lying the phenomenon of HV, as an additional mechanism of adaptation, and proposed an elementary
formalization of its core principles using a specific reward formula, which encloses the agent’s inter-
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nal physiological dynamics as part of the process of internal assessment.
There are numerous examples of this principle of adaptation in the animal world. To cite a few,
hibernating animals increase their appreciation for food consumption as temperatures start declining
and increase their foraging rhythms likewise, in a more controlled environment, it is well known that
lab animals devaluate food as they gradually satiate (Shizgal, 1997). Inspired by these observations
and on the data we previously reviewed, this study has proposed a simplified version of the natural
mechanisms influencing the internal, subjective perception of value, typically dependent on an over-
all assessment of the environment and of the agent’s internal physiological state, and consequently
influencing their behaviour. In particular, we included the agents’ internal deficits and its knowledge
of the environment as factors biasing the assessment of value used for learning and adaptation. In
this manner, our formulation of HV depends on the agent’s internal state, but also of the intensity
of the physiological effect resulting from a consummatory interaction and of the frequency of object
encounter. To test this, we performed a number of tests of adaptation in environments with different
availability and distribution of resources with an agent endowed with this formulation of reward. Our
main conclusion is that, for the given experimental setup, the manner in which reward is internally
perceived exerts a strong influence on the strategy to attain physiological stability. Remarkably, al-
though intuition dictates that it should take longer in the scarce than in the abundant scenario if based
on the number of object interactions only, the agent balanced out the learning phase by magnifying
the reward value for the fewer interactions by modifying the actor’s policy accordingly, and conse-
quently, accelerated the adaptation process. However, it is worth noting that if the agent were also
endowed with the ability of dynamically predicting the  S as it interacts with the environment, this
adaptation could be accelerated even further. The final stationary values of physiological stability
are comparable in both scenarios (see figure 6C-D). Furthermore, the advantage of an assessment
criterion dependent on the internal physiology comes forth when comparing to the theoretical case
of a value formula independent of subjective criteria. An example for the case of consummatory
behaviours is the compulsive glutton, in which the lack of sensitivity to the physiological effect of
eating leads the subject to consume food continuously beyond satiation limits in a continuous fash-
ion. Although this certainly satisfies the need of nutrition, not being able to exercise some restraint is
also detrimental for physiological stability, as the excess of satisfaction of one drive may mean that
too little time has been devoted to addressed the remaining ones.
By contrast, as we integrate the dynamics of interaction into the process of internal assessment,
we are making the agent’s internal scale of value relative to the environment in which it lives and
interacts, and importantly, dependent not on one of the agent’s homeostatic variables but on each
and everyone of them simultaneously. This implementation of external-internal dynamics, generates
a process of internal assessment grounding the agent’s assessment on the environment. Because
of this ecological formulation of reward value, it is possible to estimate the boundaries of these
policies by the ratio between the rate of decay of the agent’s internal resources over the rate of
successful encounter with objects in the environment, which again, depends on its distribution of
resources. In conclusion, although it is certainly possible to learn adaptive policies with a fixed
reward formula, we argue that the natural consequence of a grounded criterion of assessment is
the faster adaptation of overall behavioural strategies to changes of the environment. For example,
the same architecture we presented yielded strategies ranging from motivation driven to reactive, as
a function of the environment (see figure 7C, 7F and 8C). However, our agent could dynamically
alternate between these strategies as changes of the environment were presented.
Grounded hedonic value. As opposed to a fixed reward formula, the operation of our specific
formulation of hedonic value is influenced by a relative assessment between the rhythms of consump-
tion of the agent’s internal resources (⌧ decay constants) and the frequency of successful encounters
with objects of the environment. The calculation of value, in the terms proposed by the reward for-
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mula (see eq. 10), results from the mutual interaction across several external and internal factors,
often with opposite effect. First, the main contribution results from the external to internal effect that
follows a successful behaviour execution (dk 1 dk). If the execution of the behaviour did not yield
any compensatory effect, the value is negative, as the natural decay of the homeostatic variables made
dk larger than dk 1. Second, the value is also sensitive to the overall deficitary state of the agent.
Since the value of the overall deficit kdkk ranges between zero and one, the value will be magnified if
the physiological effect of that decision approaches the optimal zone (see figure 4A). Third, the value
of an interaction is also dependent on the distribution of object affordances (see figure 5) and by the
rate of object encounter in the environment, captured by the  S parameter (see methods section).
The longer the time between successful interactions, the smaller the reward.
Certainly, this is not the only possible formulation of value that could be proposed to ground
value in the environment in a dynamic fashion. However, the purpose of this study was to portray
the operation of the principle of hedonic value on behaviour, relating the basic external and internal
factors, not to provide a detailed implementation of the neural processes and dynamics underlying
reward in the brain. Although this should not be considered the last word on the matter, this study
provides a significant understanding on the mechanisms underlying adaptation, which depend on the
subjective interpretation of reward, and it may be considered as a first step towards a parsimonious
formulation of hedonic value for artificial agents.
6 Conclusion
This paper has formulated a process of internal modulation of value as an additional mechanism to
extend the agent’s adaptivity to difficult or changing environments. It shows that whenever we make
reward value dependent on the motivational state and on previous experience about the environment,
in our case recorded by the actor-critic policies, this modulation can exert a significant influence on
the behavioural cycles generated and on the agent’s overall physiological stability. Although further
study will be necessary to find specific methodologies to develop mechanisms of adaptation based
on affective phenomena, the review and results presented here highlight that this kind of processes
are called to play a significant role in behavioural adaptation.
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Figure 1. Architecture for Behaviour Selection and Learning. It consists of a module of
internal physiology (top right), including a set of homeostatic variables and internal drives,
a sensory module delivering the behaviour affordances for the closest object (bottom right),
the value function (centre top), and the actor-critic module (centre), learning behavioural
policies as a function of the value obtained by interaction with the environment (left).
Figure 2. Schematic of a 2D physiological space. The blue dots indicate a sequence of
possible behavioural executions leading to the optimal zone. As consummatory behaviours
are executed the state shifts towards the optimal zone. The viability zone is enclosed by the
lethal boundary.
Figure 3. Depiction of the motivation-driven actor-critic RL schematic. Its state consists
of the set of perceived affordances and of the values of the agent’s internal drives. This
information is used to calculate the behaviour preferences for the current state. The actor is
composed of a set of multi-layer feed-forward neural networks to implement the behaviour
preference functions (as part of the actor). Furthermore, the state-value function is also
estimated by a separate neural network as part of the critic.
Figure 4. A. Depiction of a simplified 2-D physiological space. The x and y axis repre-
sent the value for Drive 1 (D1) and Drive 2 (D2). The two red sequences represent the
time-course of the agent’s physiological state during two random behavioural cycles, which
sequentially compensate one drive after another until reaching the optimal zone. B. Depic-
tion of the agent’s 3-D physiological space. The x, y and z dimensions stand for the levels of
hunger, tiredness and restlessness of the agent. The four colour dots represent the four ini-
tial states considered to test the agent’s behavioural responses and the lines directed towards
the origin the theoretically optimal physiological transitions towards the optimal zone (see
related results in figure 9).
Figure 5. Abundant and scarce distribution of affordances as a function of object width.
We parametrised the affordances offered by each object as a function of its simulated width
parameter, which ranges between 0 and 1. The different grey areas indicate the size intervals
for an object to offer the affordance labelled no the y-axis. For example, objects of width
between 0.4 and 1.0 afford to rest in the abundant scenario (left), while this is reduced widths
between 0.4 and 0.7 in the scarce one (right).
Figure 6. A. Behavioural cycle length for the abundant scenario (see figure 5A) with respect
to baseline (ideal scenario), as a function of simulation-time (#Compensatory Cycle), during
a typical simulation run.B. Same metric for the scarce scenario (see figure 5B). C. Time-
course of the agent’s physiological stability during a simulation run (ideal scenario) for the
abundant distribution of affordances (see figure 5A) with respect to baseline. D. Likewise
for the scarce distribution of affordances (see figure 5B)
Figure 7. Analysis of behavioural patterns learned by the agent in the ideal and abun-
dant environments, which exhibit a mainly motivation-driven pattern. The simulation
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time unit on the x-axis is the decision # during the proving phase. A. Sample behavioural
cycles in an ideal environment at the beginning of a typical simulation run(cycle initiation is
signaled by vertical dashed lines). The top traces show the drive values (D1, red-hunger; D2,
green-tiredness; D3, blue-restlessness), and the drive expressing the highest urge (WTA-D)
during a few cycles. The two bottom graphs show the policy values for each behaviour
during the same behavioural cycles (B1, red-eat; B2, green-rest; B3, blue-interact), and the
behaviour # exhibiting the highest activation (WTA-B). B. Like A, but at the end of a typical
simulation run in an ideal scenario. C. Ideal Environment. Percentage of agreement of the
agent’s decisions with a purely motivation-driven policy. The x-axis scale stands for the
probing block at which the metric was calculated (see methods). D-F. Like A-C, respec-
tively, but referring to the abundant environment.
Figure 8. Analysis of behavioural patterns in the scarce environment, which exhibit
a stimulus-driven pattern. A. Sample behavioural cycles in an ideal environment at the
beginning of a typical simulation run. The top traces show the affordance values (A1, red-
eating; A2, green-rest; A3, blue-interact), and the affordance perceived with the highest
intensity (WTA-A) during a few cycles. The two bottom graphs show the policy values
for each behaviour during the same behavioural cycles (B1, red-eat; B2, green-rest; B3,
blue-interact), and the number of the behaviour exhibiting the highest activation (WTA-
B). B. Like A, but at the end of a typical simulation run in an ideal scenario. C. Scarce
Environment. Time-course of motivation-driven and stimulus/incentive driven behaviour,
averaged over 20 simulation runs each. The x-axis scale stands for the probing block at
which the metric was calculated (see methods).
Figure 9. Typical behavioural cycles for the case of the abundant (top) and scarce (bottom)
environments, recorded during the stationary regime. The 3D space represents the physi-
ological space of the agent; the initial position (blue dot) is the initial physiological state
of the cycle. The green and red traces showing the effect of the behaviour executions on
the agent’s physiological state, starting each at three possible physiological states (hunger,
tiredness, boredom), from left to right, respectively: (0.9, 0.8, 0.7), (0.5, 0.8, 0.9) and (0.9,
0.5, 0.8), and end in the optimal zone (black area).
